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Off the Precipice: Massachusetts
Expands Its Foreign Policy Expedition

from Burma to Indonesia
David R. Schmahmann
James Finch
Tia Chapman*
ABSTRACT

This Article considers the wisdom and constitutionality of
a proposed Massachusetts law penalizing companies that do
business with Indonesia. In the March 1997 issue of the
Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw, two of the authors
expressed concerns about the constitutionality of state and
local restrictions on business ties with Burma (Myanmar).
This Article applies a similar analysis to conclude that the
proposed legislation is an unconstitutional violation of the
Supremacy Clause and the Foreign Commerce Clause. The
authors also argue that the federal government has clearly
preempted action by Massachusetts:first by providing aid to
Indonesia under the generalized system of preferences;
second, through involving the Export-ImportBank in fostering
trade with Indonesia, third, by enacting the International
Rubber Agreement, which may requireIndonesiancooperation
for its success; and fourth, through Congress's own

consideration and rejection of trade sanctions against
Indonesia.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the Massachusetts legislature made Massachusetts
the first state in the United States to impose trade sanctions on
the government of Burma.1 These sanctions penalize companies
that do business with Burma by making it nearly impossible for
2
them to do business with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
The wisdom of a Massachusetts foreign policy with respect to
Burma has been questioned. 3 Moreover, even a cursory reading
of U.S. Supreme Court cases and the U.S. Constitution makes it
absolutely clear that the Massachusetts foreign policy initiative

1.

See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7, §§ 22G-M (West 1997).

2.
The Massachusetts statute applies to (1) companies which have their
principal place of business, place of incorporation, or corporate headquarters in
Burma; (2) companies which have operations, leases, franchises, majority-owned
subsidiaries, distribution agreements, or similar agreements in Burma: (3)
companies which provide financial services to the Burmese government: (4)
companies which promote the importation or sale of gems, timber, oil, gas, or
related products, where commerce is controlled by the government; and (5)
companies which provide goods or services to the government. Massachusetts
passed the law in June 1996. See &dL§ 22G.
3.
See, e.g., Vie Very Long Arn of the Law: Is the world readyfor 7,284

secretarlesof state?,U.S. NEws &WORLD REP., Oct. 14, 1996, at 57.
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with respect to Burma is unconstitutional. Two of the authors
have analyzed these constitutional issues and recently published
4
their analysis in the VanderbiltJournalof TransnationalLaw.
The impact of Massachusetts's anti-Burma legislation is
circumscribed by the limited foreign multinational corporate
Even so, the Massachusetts initiative
presence in Burma.5
provoked a furor in the European Union and Japan because of its
Trade Organization Convention
likely contravention of the World
6
on government procurement
In taking on Indonesia as its next foreign policy initiative, the
Massachusetts legislature risks taking the people of the state into
even riskier territory with repercussions that may go well beyond
the contemplation of state lawmakers.

II. THE VASTNESS OF U.S. INTERESTS IN INDONESIA
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world
and is the world's largest Muslim country. 7 The United States
has a broad range of interests in this huge country and its
economy. The Indonesian economy has a growth rate of seven to
eight percent per year, and is projected to be the fifth largest
economy in the world by 2020. 8 While the Investor Responsibility
Research Center reports that there are only eighteen publicly
traded U.S. parent companies with direct investment or
employees in Burma, 9 there are 240 such companies with ties to

4.

See David Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstituttonality of

State and Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with
Burma tMyanmar), 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1997).
5.
Hearings on H. 3730 Before the Joint

Committee

on

State

Administration, 180th General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
(Feb. 27, 1997) (statement of Brenda Bateman, Burma Project Manager of the
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)) [hereinafter Hearings].
Japan and the European Union say the Massachusetts law violates a
6.
1993 World Trade Organization (hereinafter WTO) agreement to keep government

purchasing open to all bidders on both sides of the ocean.

Lorraine Woellert,

BurmaBoycotts Collide with Trade Agreements, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1997, at Al.

The European Commission has officially informed U.S. Trade Representative
Charlene Barshefsky that it is beginning the process that leads to filing a formal
complaint with the WTO about the Massachusetts law. Frank Phillips, Group to
Fight Mass. Burma Law, BOSTON GLOBE, June 21, 1997, at B3. Japan has also
fied a formal complaint about the Massachusetts law. JapanMay Test State's
BurmaLaw, BOSTON GLOBE, July 11, 1997, at B7.

7.
Pell).

142 CONG. REc. S11,238 (daffy ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen.

See 142 CONG. REC. S13,027 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of
8.
Sen. Cochran).
9.
MuINATONAL BUSINESS IN BURMA (Investor Responsibility Research
Ctr., D.C.) Feb. 1997, at iv.
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Indonesia.' 0 Annual bilateral trade between the United States
and Indonesia is about $12.3 billion. 1 1 The United States is one
of Indonesia's largest foreign investors, with direct investments
totalling more than $12 billion between 1967 and 1996.12
U.S. exports to Indonesia have quadrupled since 1987. In
1995, U.S. exports to Indonesia grew by nearly twenty percent to
$3.4 billion, and are estimated to have reached $4.0 billion, or
9.7% of Indonesia's total imports, in 1996,13 and support more
than ninety-five thousand jobs in the United States. 14 In 1996,
U.S. imports from Indonesia reached $8.2 billion. 15 Indonesia
received $96 million in U.S. economic aid in 1995, and $71
million in U.S. economic aid in 1996.16 Indonesia is also a key
member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(hereinafter ASEAN), which is America's third-largest source of
17
imports and its fourth-largest export market.
Finally, Indonesia is significant to U.S. interests for its
rubber production. The United States is by far and away the
world's largest importer of natural rubber and seventy-five
percent of the world's natural rubber supply is produced
in just
18
three countries: Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
III. THE UNCONST1TUTIONALrIY OF THE MASSACHUSETS
ANTI-INDONESIA MEASURES

A. Supremacy Clause

The anti-Indonesia law proposed by Massachusetts Is nearly
identical to its anti-Burma law, and the analysis that leads to the
conclusion that the anti-Burma law violates the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution applies with equal force. 19

10.
See Hearings, supra note 5.
11.
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Intl Trade Admin., The Trade Informaton
Center's Asia & Pacific Web
Site, (visited Oct.
3,
1997)
<http://infoserv2.ita.doc.gov/apweb.nsf> [hereinafter Asia & PacificWebsite].
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
See 141 CONG. REC. S15,582 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Bond).
15.
Asia& Pacjc Website, supranote 11.
16.
Id.

17.

Id.

18.
See 142 CONG. REc. S11,249 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Helms).
19.
See Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 4, at 198-99.

19971

UNCONSTTIIMONALRESTRCITON OFBUSINESS WITHINVDONESIA 1025

Briefly stated, the argument is this: the Supremacy Clause 20
gives the federal government an exclusive power to conduct U.S.
foreign policy. Local enactments designed to chart a distinctive

local course in foreign affairs risk running afoul of this

constitutional

mandate.

unambiguous in

The Supreme Court has been

defining the boundary of permissible local

actions:
The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective
interests of the forty-eight states, is entrusted with full and
exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign
sovereignties. "For local interests the several states of the Union
exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with
foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power."
Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities,
counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the
whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field
relations be left entirely free from local
affecting foreign
interference. 2 1

In another landmark decision, Zschemig v. Miller,22 the
Supreme Court defined the scope of "affecting foreign relations"
broadly. 2 3 In that case, the Court held that an Oregon statute,
even in the undeniably local matter of inheritance, was
unconstitutional when it prohibited residents of East Germany
from inheriting under Oregon wills. 24 The Court struck down the
statute because it "affects international relations in a persistent
and subtle way," and because local statutes "must give way if they
impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy."2 5 The
Court made its decision in spite of an amicus brief filed by the
Justice Department indicating that the Department had no
26
objection to Oregon's statutory stand against Communism.
Justice Stewart responded to the brief by saying that the
allocation of power between the states and the federal government
was so fundamental to the Constitution that it could not "vary
from day to day with the shifting winds at the State
Department."2 7 Thus, even local statutes that support U.S.

foreign policy objectives are out of their depth if they affect
international relations in a persistent and subtle way.

20.
21.
Exclusion
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (quoting Chinese
Cases, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)).
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
I& at 441.
Id.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id.

1026

VANDERBILTJOURVAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW [VoL 30:1021

The logic of this is clear: "If a state action could defeat or
alter our foreign policy, serious consequences might ensue. The
nation as a whole would be held to answer if a State created
difficulties with a foreign power."2 8 Clearly a Massachusetts law

designed to punish a foreign country for its actions-especially
when the law is devoid of any context within the nation's foreign
policy-violates this constitutional principle.
B. ForeignCommerce Clause
The Foreign Commerce Clause of the Constitution 2 9 prohibits

states or localities from regulating or taxing commerce if such
actions burden interstate or foreign commerce. 3 0 With regard to
foreign commerce, the Supreme Court has held that the federal
government's regulatory power is "exclusive,"3 1 and found
"evidence that the [Flounders intended the scope of the foreign
commerce power to be ... greater" than the federal government's
power to regulate interstate commerce. 3 2
The Court has
repeatedly emphasized the importance, when it comes to foreign
matters and commercial relations, of the nation "speaking with
one voice."

33

This is not a situation where the state is simply imposing a
requirement necessary to protect the health, welfare, and
legitimate interests of its population. In attempting to blacklist
from its contract roster all businesses present in any degree in
Indonesia, the Massachusetts anti-Indonesia initiative seeks to
affect foreign trade with Indonesia, the Indonesian economy
(although it is hard to foresee who will emerge more bruised, the
state or the Indonesians), and the nation's relations with
Indonesia. Any argument that the foreign trade or policy
consequences of the Massachusetts initiative are merely
incidental consequences of the state permissibly minding its own
affairs is specious, and under governing Supreme Court cases
34
destined to fal.

28.
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 232 (1942).
29.
U.S. CoNsr. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 3.
30.
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283 (1976).
31.
IL at 286.
32.
Japan LAne v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979).
33.
Id. at 449 (citing MIchelin, 423 U.S. at 285).
34.
For a discussion of the so-called Market Participant Doctrine and its
inapplicability to state foreign policy expeditions, see Schmahmann & Finch,
supra note 4, at 191-97.
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C. FederalLaw Preemptionof the Massachusetts
Anti-IndonesiaBill
Clearly, states and the federal government cannot have laws
that cover the same subject matter when those laws are in
pursuit of inconsistent objectives or create the possibility of
confusion or futility. Article VI of the Constitution addresses this
problem, which arises out of the federal artifact of coextensive
sovereigns, by providing that it is the laws and treaties of the
United States that are "the Supreme Law of the Land" and prevail
over, or preempt, state and local enactments.3 5 Thus, any local
law that purports to regulate or govem a matter explicitly or
implicitly covered by federal legislation is preempted, even if it is
in an area otherwise amenable to state regulation. In Hines v.
Davidowitz,3 6 for example, the Supreme Court struck down an
attempt by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to impose
registration requirements on aliens that were to some extent
consistent with federal requirements but which in several
respects were more onerous. The Court noted that since the
'[the
"basic subject of the state and federal laws is identical ....
only question is whether.., the state and Federal Government
,"37 In foreign affairs they do
have concurrent jurisdiction ....
not, and the Massachusetts initiative runs directly counter, in
intent and effect, to a variety of existing federal programs.
Even legislation that is facially consistent with a stated
federal policy may be preempted if the Court finds that it intrudes
38
on foreign commerce. In South-CentralTimber Dev. v. Wunnicke,
the Court struck down an Alaskan statute that required any
timber sold within the state to be processed in Alaska. Even

though this requirement did not conflict with any federal law, the
Court held that the state had to show more than consistency with
federal policy when its statutes intruded on foreign commerce.
Moreover, in Wisconsin Dep't of Industry V. Gou/d,3 9 the Supreme
Court struck down a state contract debarment law facially
consistent with a federal statutory scheme because it impinged on
federal jurisdiction. In that case the State of Wisconsin had
sought to punish companies that had repeatedly violated the
National Labor Relations Act by adding a state coercive measure
to ensure compliance with federal law. The Supreme Court
disapproved, holding that Wisconsin could not enact such

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
312 U.S. 52, 54 (1941).
1& at 61 (quoting Argument for Appellants, id. at 55).
467 U.S. 82 (1984).
475 U.S. 282 (1986).
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In doing so, the Court expressed a concern

appropriate to the proposed Indonesia sanctions:

that the

proliferation of local sanctions, while not inconsistent with federal
law, "further detracts from the 'integrated scheme of regulation'
created by Congress."40 "[Ihf Wisconsin's debarment law is valid,
nothing prevents other States from taking similar action against
labor law violators .

.

. Each additional statute incrementally

diminishes the Board's control over enforcement of the NLRA
41 The state's "goal may be laudable, but it assumes for the

.....

State of Wisconsin a role Congress reserved exclusively for the
42
[National Labor Relations] Board."
Juxtaposing federal law regulating trade with Indonesia and
the Massachusetts initiative leaves little room for a plausible
argument that the state initiative is not preempted. Indeed, the
Massachusetts measure runs the risk of tripping all over federal
foreign policy toward Indonesia.
Federal actions signifying the approach the government has
charted for the nation with regard to Indonesia are discussed
below.
1. U.S. Aid to Indonesia under the Generalized
System of Preferences
In 1996, Indonesia ranked fourth among top suppliers of U.S.
imports for consumption under the Generalized System of
Preferences. 43 As stated above, Indonesia received $96 million in
U.S. economic aid in 1995, and $71 million in U.S. economic aid
In 1996. 44 In 1994, the Clinton administration decided to renew
the special trade status, which Indonesia presently enjoys. 45
That decision resulted in a continued break on tariffs for
industrial goods such as electronics, machinery, and spare parts,
which Indonesia exports to the United States. The decision also
helped insure continued foreign capital investment in the
booming Indonesian market.46 Congress has clearly implied that
free and open trade with Indonesia is within the interests of the
United States.

40.
41.

Il at 288.
Id.

42.
43.

Id. at 291.
Asia & PacifL Website, supranote 11.

44.
45.

Id.
David E. Sanger, Admlnisbatuon Moves to Defend IndonesiaPolicy After

Cticism, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 17. 1996. at Al.
46.

Id.
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2. The Export-Import Bank of the United States
While Massachusetts threatens to sanction all companies

doing business with Indonesia, the Export-Import Bank of the
U.S. (hereinafter Ex-Im Bank) is allocating funds toward fostering
trade with Indonesia. The Ex-Im Bank is an independent U.S.
government agency created by Congress in 1934 to create U.S.
jobs through exports' 4 7 and to help finance the overseas sales of
U.S. goods and services. 48 In 1995, the Ex-Im Bank helped
broker a $500 million package for Indonesia's first private-sector
power project. The project will provide seven thousand new
American jobs 4 9-obviously
a national priority.
The
Massachusetts initiative, if successful, will do the opposite. 50
Thus, when Massachusetts attempts to restrict trade with
Indonesia, it not only acts inconsistently with the federal
government in its pursuit of domestic job creation, but it
interferes with congressional objectives and the potential success
of the Ex-im Bank.
3. The International Natural Rubber Agreement's Contemplation
of Extensive Trade with Indonesia
Another example of how the Massachusetts measure operates
at cross purposes with federal objectives can be seen in
connection with the International Natural Rubber Agreement of
1995 (hereinafter the Agreement).5 1 On September 25, 1996, the
U.S. Senate ratified this Agreement for an additional four years.
The Agreement attempts to stabilize the supply and price levels of
natural rubber using U.S. Treasury funds. Through a buffer-

stock mechanism, the treaty assures that natural rubber will be
available to the United States in sufficient supply and at
reasonable prices.5 2 Indonesia, the world's second-largest natural
rubber producer,5 3 is obviously important to the Agreement's
success.
For the Agreement to enter into force, countries
representing eighty percent of exports and eighty percent of

47.
A brief history of the Eport-lmport Bank of the United States last
modified May 30, 1996) <http://www.exim.gov/history.htm]>.
48.
Id.
49.
See 141 CONG. REc. E986 (daily ed. May 10, 1995).
50.
See Hearings, supra note 5 (statement of Don Baldini of Associated
Industries of Massachusetts and statement of Jim Teague, United Parcel Service,
Public Relations).
51.
142 CONG. REc. S1 1,248 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996).
52.
Id. (statement of Sen. Helms).
53.
MalayMinds Only Meet Not Meld, AsiAWEEK, Oct. 4, 1996, at 8.
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imports need to ratify it.5 4 Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand

represent seventy-five percent of world's natural rubber exports. 5 5

Because the Massachusetts initiative would punish all companies
Importing products controlled by the government of Indonesiasuch as rubber-the proposed Massachusetts statute may create
confusion about which "voice" speaks for the nation. It may
interfere with the U.S. rubber trade, and may even alienate the
Indonesian government to the point that it may withhold further
cooperation with the treaty.
4. Congress's Rejection of the Massachusetts Approach
Finally, Congress has considered Indonesia's human rights
record and acted thereon in a way it considers appropriate.
During the past two years, for example, Congress has engaged in
several heated debates over whether or not to eliminate U.S. aid
to Indonesia for expanded international military education and
training (hereinafter IME. 56 In 1992, Congress voted to end all
IMET assistance for Indonesia because of the country's human
rights record. 57 In 1995, however, Congress resumed a modified
IMET program for Indonesia in the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1996. 5 8 Congress describes this
modified IMET program as "expanded" IMET aid. Expanded IMET
funds differ from standard IMET funds in that they may only be
used for human rights-related training. Thus, the funds, as
opposed to being "expanded," are actually "restricted." These
actions indicate that Congress has taken action in connection
with Indonesia's human rights record without imposing trade
sanctions. By implication, it is clear that Congress has decided
against trade sanctions for Indonesia.
Other developments in connection with the IMET program
suggest that Congress does not wish to impose trade sanctions
against Indonesia. During the 104th Congress, Representative
Barney Frank of Massachusetts offered an amendment

54.

Intemattonal Natural Rubber Agreement Due to Come Into Force, Agri.

Serv. Int, Feb. 7. 1997, availabein LEXIS, News Library. EURASI File.
55.
See supranote 18 and accompanying text.
56.
The IMET program sponsors up and coming Indonesian military
officers to study in the United States. Officers receive technical training, such as
accounting, or professional education which includes military justice and human
rights awareness.
57.
The suspension of IMET aid came in response to a November 12, 1991
shooting incident in East Timor by Indonesian security forces against Timorese
demonstrators. See 142 CONG. REC. H6152 (daily ed. June 11, 1996) (statement
of Rep. Reed).
58.
142 CONG. REc. H6152 (daily ed. June 11, 1996) (statement of Rep.

Wilson).
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(hereinafter Frank Amendment) to eliminate all IMET funding for
Indonesia, as had been the case from 1992-1995.59 The House
rejected the Frank Amendment by a recorded vote of 272 to 149.60
In debate, the amendment's opponents emphasized Indonesia's
importance to U.S. trade and national security. Representative
Charles Wilson, for example, described Indonesia as "one of Asia's
most promising expanding markets for American goods," and
added that the IMET aid program helps "open opportunities for
61
U.S. business."
Several members of Congress have opposed the imposition of
any restrictions on IMET aid to Indonesia. Instead, they favor
allowing Indonesia full IMET funding. Currently, Indonesia is the
only country to receive "expanded" IMET funding. For example,
Senator Thad Cochran, arguing in favor of full IMET funding for
Indonesia, asked, "Why it is that of all the countries participating
in IMET, only Indonesia is singled out for restrictions?" 6 2 He
further suggested: "Think about the other 108 fiscal year 1995
unrestricted IMET participants, Burundi, Ethiopia, Cambodia,
Russia, and Algeria. Are we saying they don't have any human
63
rights problems?"

During the 105th Congress, Representative Frank again
offered an amendment to eliminate all IMET funding for
This bill was referred to the Committee on
Indonesia. 6 4
International Relations. Before the committee could act on the
bill, however, the government of Indonesia announced that it
would not accept IMET aid. 65 In a White House press briefing on
June 6, 1997, Michael McCurry said that the Clinton
Administration regretted Indonesia's rejection of the aid.6 6 He
said that the United States has a bilateral relationship with
67
Indonesia, "in which we cooperate in a number of areas."

See 142 CONG. REc. H6150 (daily ed. June 20, 1995).
59.
See 142 CoNG. REC. H6156 (daily ed. June 11, 1996).
60.
61.
142 CONG. REc. H6152 (daily ed. June 11, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Wilson).
62.
142 CONG. REc. S8945 (daily ed. July 26, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Cochran).
Id.
63.
64.
H.R 720, 105th Cong. (1997).
65.
Indonesia also expressed that it had no interest in buying nine
American-made F-16's. The Clinton administration was trying to find some way
to dispose of the fighter planes that it had originally sold to Paldstan but which
could not be delivered because of the Pressler amendment. The administration
had focused on Indonesia as a possible sales prospect. See 143 CONG. REC.
H3609 (daily ed. June 10, 1997) (statement of Rep. Kennedy).
66.
Transcript of White House Briefing by Mike McCurry, U.S. Newswlre,
June 6, 1997, availabeIn LEXIS, News Library, USNWR File.
67.
Id.
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Representative Douglas Bereuter called Indonesia's refusal a blow
to U.S. relations with Indonesia. He said:
Indonesia is not Burma or Iraq. It is an important country, a key
member of ASEAN, APEC, the ARF, the OIC, and the United
Nations... [.] Indonesia has... contributed to the Korean Energy
Development Organization. Indonesia supported the gulf war
efforts against Iraq. Indonesia's sealanes and air routes are
important to United States forces. We. of course, have major
economic interest [sic] in Indonesia. Our annual bilateral trade is
68
about $12.3 billion.

Clearly, whether or not the United States plans to extend
IMET to Indonesia has been a matter of some debate. Congress
has argued over whether or not Indonesia has made substantial
human rights improvements, and what the definition of such
improvements ought to be. Regardless of what Congress decides,
it appears that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is poised to
enact legislation on the matter which, if given effect, would
conflict with and probably undermine the federal decision.
Obviously, the Constitution does not countenance such an
intrusion.

IV. CONCLUSION
It is not clear that trade sanctions themselves are an effective
means of conducting foreign policy, and certainly where parochial
concerns are projected into an international arena, the prospect
69
of a coherent trade sanction policy is severely compromised.
The current Massachusetts initiative is apparently motivated by
state legislators' desires to satisfy some Portuguese-American
constituents who have voiced concerns about East Timor. 70 Yet,
the consequences of such Massachusetts action may be felt by
citizens and in states where East Timor is not a major concern.
The federal government, far from attempting to isolate Indonesia,
has implemented a variety of programs designed to do just the
opposite.

68.
143 CONG. REc. H3609 (daily ed. June 10, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Bereuter).
69.
See Schmahmann & Finch, supranote 4, at 204-07.
70.
During the debate over the Frank Amendment, Rep. Bereuter said, "I
understand that the gentleman from Massachusetts. and both gentlemen from
Rhode Island have very big Portuguese American populations in their districts."
142 CONG. REC. H6153 (daily ed. June 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Bereuter).
Prior to its annexation by Indonesia, East Timor was a Portuguese colony and its
inhabitants are primarily Catholic whereas the majority of Indonesians are
Muslim 142 CONG. REc. S11,239 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (report of Sen. Pell).
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At present, the Massachusetts Legislature is buoyed by the
apparent success of its anti-Burma initiative. 7 1 If it proceeds with
its plans to punish Indonesia, however, it may lead the state into
a maze of confusion, retribution, and litigation.

71.
Byron Rushing, one of the prime sponsors of the bill which imposed
sanctions on Burma for human rights abuses, was quoted in the Boston Globe as
saying that the federal sanctions proved Massachusetts was right all along and
that he was something of a trail blazer: "We look good. It shows we are on the
cutting edge of the issue." Frank Phillips, State was in Lead on Burma: Backers of
Mass. Law Welcome U.S. Sanctions, BosToN GLOBE, Apr. 23, 1997, at BI.

